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Student Vandalism and Public Schools:
The Scope of the Illinois Educators'
Directive to Discipline
DONALD SHAWLER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Four days prior to the outset of summer vacation, a break in
occurred at the Thomas middle school. Unnamed student suspects,
upset at being excluded from the yearly field trip, pried two plexiglass
windows off their frames to gain access inside the school. The
students, ages eleven and thirteen, vandalized the entire building.
Upon entering the classroom, the vandals overturned desks,
scattered textbooks, urinated on the floor, and ignited a roll of paper
towels; an adjoining library was similarly wrecked. Continuing their
siege, the culprits discharged dry-cell fire extinguishers in the hallway,
smashed pint-sized milk cartons against the kitchen wall, and emptied
two large boxes of vegetables on the floor. Damage to the institution
totaled $300.
Members of the school board, still uncertain of their rights and
responsibilities after consulting counsel, opposed any disciplinary
measures against the students. 1
II.

OVERVIEW

The situation is common. Across the country, officials answerable
for secondary education are continually frustrated by pupils' malicious
2
destruction and theft of school property. According to an annual
Gallup Poll, lack of student discipline is consistently ranked the
*

B.S. cum laude 1983, University of Illinois; J.D. magna cum laude 1986,

Southern Illinois University. Judicial Clerk, Honorable Richard Mills, United States
District Judge for the Central District of Illinois.
1. The events portrayed occurred in Carbondale, Illinois in the Spring 1985.
The facts surrounding the crime were taken from reports of the Carbondale Police
Department. (available at the Northern Illinois University Law Review).
2. See generally, NATIONAL INST. OF EDUC., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC.

AND WELFARE, VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS (1978) (nationwide study of violence and vandalism in the public
schools).
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biggest problem confronting educators today.' The statistics reflect
vandalism's persistent presence.
While authorities disagree as to the exact cost vandalism aimed
at public education imposes on taxpayers, all concur that the figure
is colossal. Estimates have ranged from $200 to $600 million annually.4
The lower end, however, has been criticized as "grossly understated,"
as it fails to account for the price of increasing insurance rates and
security.' Broken down, a $500 million bill represents approximately
$10 per student a year, or $55,000 per school district. 6 This loss could
finance for an entire year a school breakfast program designed to
feed 133 children. 7
Among vandals favorite escapades are breaking windows and
setting fires. Every month, students commit 2400 acts of arson in
public institutions.8 A large district could buy a new school with the
money it spends each year replacing windows. 9 Some youth simply
will not be outdone. Reports abound of their blowing apart toilets
with cherry bombs,' 0 or leaving bunsen burners ignited in a laboratory
and turning on the gas jets hoping that the room might eventually
explode." Schools reportedly consume the vandalism dollar as follows:
1) fire damage-39.6 cents, 2) glass breakage-25.4 cents, 3) property
destruction-19.6 cents, and 4) equipment theft-15.4 cents.' 2
3. Silas, School Conflicts: Discipline v. Student Rights, 70 A.B.A. J.37 (Jan.
1984); Stagliano & Hyman, State Dept. of Educ., Activities to Reduce School Violence
and Vandalism, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 67 n.1 (Sept. 1983).
4. See, e.g., Patsey, Curbing Violence and Vandalism in Our Schools: A
Judicial View of What Must Be Done, 11 THRUST I I (Oct. 1981) ($600 million) (study

of the Nat'l School Resource Network and Cal. School Safety Center); Challenge for

the Third Century: Education in a Safe Environment-Final Report on the Nature
and Prevention of School Violence and Vandalism: Report of the Subcomm. to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977) ($590 million)
(hereinafter cited as Final Report); Our Nation's Schools-A Report Card: "A " in
School Violence and Vandalism: Preliminary Report of the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975) ($200 million) (study of Educ.

U.S.A. and Nat'l School Public Relations Ass'n) [hereinafter Prelim. Report].
5. E. Wells, VANDALISM AND VIOLENCE: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES REDUCE

TO SCHOOLS

at 6-7.

COST

5 (1971) (Educ. U.S.A. Special Report); Prelim. Report, supra note 4,

6. Prelim. Report, supra note 4, at 6.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Flaherty, Reducing Vandalism By Changing the School Community, 16
THRUST 29 (Feb./Mar. 1987).
9. Final Report, supra note 4, at 35.
10. Flaherty, supra note 8, at 29.
11. Final Report, supra note 4, at 36.
12. Id.
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Although Illinois does not compile data specifically related to the
ruin of its schools, a report from the Office of Education suggests
3
the problem in this State is no less than that in any other. Contrary
to what one might expect, vandalism is not limited to the metropolitan
area: "Property crime .. .is generally spread . ..evenly across the
socioeconomic backstandard demographic categories of family
14
ground, race, sex and size of community.'
Much which is beyond the scope of this article has been written
on the causes and cures of student vandalism. 5 As the studies note,
its effects clearly reach further than the dollars expended on destroyed
and stolen property.' 6 Probably its most serious consequence is the
disruption of the educational process. Consequently, school boards
and administrators, especially at the secondary level, must exercise
broad authority to punish wrongdoers and a fortiori preserve that
system which is the linchpin of American society.
This article will focus on the ability of instructional policymakers
and implementers to act decisively against student vandals, free from
the fear that courts will second-guess their sound discretion. Since
officials generally prefer suspension or expulsion for egregious conduct such as vandalism, leaving corporeal punishment to correct
classroom misbehavior, the legal ramifications of the former options
will be emphasized. 7 Following a brief summary of school discipline's
development, the focus turns to a discussion of the federal constitutional standards by which all public educators are bound. Illinois
lawmakers' treatment of the relevant issues will then be considered.
13. ILLINOIS OFFICE OF EDUC., DEPT. OF PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION,
TOWARD SAFER SCHOOLS IN ILLINOIS: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SCHOOL VIOLENCE

AND VANDALISM 5-7 (1978) (similar patterns emerged in the Illinois study and the
Safe School Study, supra note 2) thereinafter Task Force Report].
14. Id. at 7. See also Goldman, Restitution for Damages to Public School
Property, 11 J. L. & EDUC. 147-48 (1982); Final Report, supra note 4, at 34.
15. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 13; ILLINOIS OFFICE OF EDUC.,

DEPT. OF PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, TOWARD SAFER SCHOOLS IN ILLINOIS:
MANUAL TO REDUCE VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM (1978); Venturini, A Survey on Causes

of School Vandalism, 66 HIGH SCHOOL J. 7-9 (Oct./Nov. 1982); Mayer & Butterworth,

Evaluating a Preventive Approach to Reducing School Vandalism, 62

PHI DELTA

KAPPAN 498-99 (March 1981).
16. Final Report, supra note 4,at 19; Prelim. Report, supra note 4,at 7-8.
17. Suspension is generally a function of a school administrator and involves

exclusion from school for a short period of time. Expulsion, on the other hand, is a

function of the school board and concerns a much longer period. Lawmakers have
not yet defined what exact time frames constitute either of the two measures. R.
VACCA &

H.

HUDGINS,

LIABIITY OF SCHOOL OFFICIALS AND

CIVn. RIGHTS TORTS § 4.5 (1982).

ADMINISTRATORS

FOR
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At that point, an analysis of the introductory scenario is in order.
Lastly, the author includes an appendix setting forth a proposed

regulation which may assist educators in drafting rules to confront
student vandalism.

III.

IN Loco PARENTIS

Prior to free public education"8 and compulsory attendance laws, 9
instructors possessed virtually unlimited authority to discipline their
pupils provided the punishment at least tenuously related to the wellbeing of the class.20 Such control arose from the concept of in loco
parentis-the idea that the master acted as a parent in chastising the
student. 2' As Blackstone first stated in his Commentaries:
[The parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority
. . . to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in
loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the
parent committed to his charge, viz, that of restraint and
correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for
which he is employed.

22

In the United States, this precept was initially construed to mean
that unless a teacher inflicted permanent physical injury upon the
child motivated by malice, courts would presume his judgment correct. 23 But eventually, judges realized the unfairness of this approach,
18. See ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (education in public schools through the
secondary level shall be free).
19. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 26-1 (1987) (education is mandatory
between the ages of 7 and 16).
20. Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests, 61 ILL. B.J. 638
(1973); H. HUDGINS & R. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND
COURT DECISIONS 289-90 (2d ed. 1985).
21. The Illinois General Assembly has codified the doctrine at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, paras. 24-24, 34-84a (1987) (paragraph 24-24 applies to cities with a
population of less than 500,000 and paragraph 34-84a applies to cities with a
population greater than 500,000): "Teachers and other certificated educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools ....
In all matters relating to the
discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in the
relation of parents and guardians to the pupils.. . ." See Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd.
of Educ., 63 111. 2d 165, 170, 347 N.E.2d 705, 707-08 (1976).
22. SPRAGUE, ABRIDGMENT OF BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 83 (1893).

23. See, e.g., State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 365, 366-68 (1837).
The English approach was even more deferential:
A schoolmaster has a prescriptive right to beat; and an action of assault
and battery cannot be admitted against him unless there be some great
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and began to review disciplinary matters under a reasonableness
standard.14 They continued, however, to give the instructor much
deference.25
Although teachers commonly utilized the doctrine of in loco
parentis as a defense to actions alleging their use of excessive corporeal
punishment, 26 some early decisions applied the principle to affirm
school administrators' determinations excluding students from the
classroom.2 7 Still, these cases are anomalies.218 As it relates to discipline, the maxim that an educator stands in the shoes of a parent
29
never had much luck expanding beyond the realm of a spanking.
This is not to say that courts ever granted school officials any
less discretion in deciding the necessity for suspension or expulsion.
In McCormick v. Burt, 0 a student's suit against school directors for
damages arising from a purportedly improper suspension, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated the general rule: "It is not enough to aver the
action of such officers was erroneous, but it must be averred and
excess, some barbarity. In our schools in England many boys have been
maimed, yet I never heard of an action against a schoolmaster on that
account.
Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 173, 7 So. 268, 270 (1890) (quoting 2 BOSWELL, BOSWELL's
LIFE OF JOHNSON 89-96 (1772)).
24. See, e.g., Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 123-24 (1859).
25. For a good historical perspective of discipline's role in American education
see I. TAYLOR, PUBLIC SCHOOLS 173-91 (1893); H. VOORHESS, THE LAW OF THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 166-95 (1916).
Because of the state courts' construction of the in loco parentis doctrine, even
today in Illinois a student must prove that a teacher acted in a wilful and wanton
manner before civil liability will be imposed for an unjustified paddling. Holt v.
Cross, 121 Ill. App. 3d 695, 696, 460 N.E.2d 8, 9 (5th Dist. 1983); Baikie v. Luther
High School S., 51 111. App. 3d 405, 408-09, 366 N.E.2d 542, 545 (1st Dist. 1977);
Gordon v. Oak Park School Dist., 24 Ill. App. 3d 131, 134, 320 N.E.2d 389, 392
(1st Dist. 1974). Whether a teacher's corporeal punishment amounts to criminal
battery, however, is tested by its reasonableness. People v. Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 40,
317 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1974).
26. Mawdsley, supra note 20, at 638.
27. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150, 155 (1878); Sherman
v. Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160, 167 (1851).
28. See Zirkel & Reichner, Is the In Loco ParentisDoctrine Dead? 15 J.L. &
EDUC.

271, 273 n.8 (1986).

29. While some courts invoked the doctrine to uphold administrators' searches
of students under the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States
repudiated that approach in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), finding that
such actions were governed by a reasonable suspicion standard. Id. at 332 n.2 & 34143.
30. 95 Ill. 263 (1880).
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proved that such action was taken in bad faith, either wantonly or
maliciously.'"'"
Today, neither the in loco parentis doctrine nor subjective good
faith shields school boards and administrators from liability.3 2 While
officials continue to wield substantial disciplinary authority over their
students, the exercise of that power is legal in nature and thus
ultimately subject to the United States Constitution."
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Over the past twenty years, courts have clarified substantially the
constitutional minima with which public schools must comport in
determining whether to exclude a student? 4 Since the Supreme Court

of the United States' 1969 declaration in Tinker v. Des Moines School

District that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the

schoolhouse gate,35 federal forums have addressed a bevy of com-

plaints alleging unlawful exclusion from the classroom.3 6 That pupils
31. McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263, 266 (1880). Accord Churchill v. Fewkes,
13 11. App. 520, 525-26 (4th Dist. 1883).
32. See infra note 106.
33. See Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (N.D. I11.1976) (in loco
parentis authority of school officials cannot transcend students' constitutional rights).
34. As state officials, the overseers of public education are unquestionably
subject to constitutional restraints. See e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 981
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
35. 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511 (1969). In Tinker, three students who wore black
armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam conflict were suspended for violating
a written policy against such activity. Characterizing the armbands as a form of
symbolic speech protected by the first amendment, the Court held the prohibition
could not be sustained where the record failed to show that the students' conduct
might substantially disrupt school activities. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
A discussion of how first amendment considerations might affect educators'
judgment in disciplinary proceedings is outside the present subject matter's domain.
See generally Annotation, First Amendment Rights of Free Speech and Press As
Applied to Public Schools-Supreme Court Cases, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1466 (1987). An
argument that acts of vandalism constitute symbolic speech is indefensible. Actions
which interfere with the maintenance of proper discipline in the operation of the
school have never been accorded constitutional protection. See Bethel School Dist.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 513. Compare Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 569 (1988) (question of whether first
amendment compels authorities to tolerate particular student speech as decided in
Tinker differs from question of whether Constitution requires them to condone
content of school-sponsored publication).
36. These actions are uniformly brought by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which,
in effect, provides the remedy for a "constitutional tort" committed by a public

1988:871

STUDENT VANDALISM

have both procedural and substantive guarantees is now well established.
A.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

A few state courts, as early as the late 1800's, recognized as a
matter of common law a school official's duty to provide a suspended
child with a hearing.3 7 In 1887, a Pennsylvania county court ruled a
public institution could not justify expelling a student without giving

him a fair chance to rebut the accusations against him39 by confronting
4
0
witnesses." But this was not the general rule in Illinois or elsewhere.
Illinois decisions apparently required nothing more than the authori-

ties' consideration of "some evidence" in connection with the inci-

dent. 41 Not until the Fifth Circuit's 1961 ruling in Dixon v. Alabama

the student's
State Board of Education did a federal court recognize
42
right to a hearing as constitutionally mandated.

official:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
37. E.g., Bishop v. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 462, 43 N.E. 191, 192 (1896). See
also H. TRUSSLER, ESSENTIALS OF SCHOOL LAW 18 (1927) (all students should have

common law right to a hearing).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. C. 77, 82-83 (1887).
39. See People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 21011, 134 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1st Dist. 1956) (student has no right to a hearing prior to
App. 342, 346expulsion from a public university); Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill.
47 (1913) (high school pupil accused of misconduct is not entitled to present evidence
of innocence to school board).
40. E.g., Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 173, 134 S.E. 360, 363 (1926); Vermillion
v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110-12, 110 N.W. 736, 737 (1907). See also
N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 606 (3d ed. 1971).

41. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406
(1957).
42. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See generally
Annotation, Right of Student to Hearing on Charges Before Suspension or Expulsion
From EducationalInstitution, 58 A.L.R.2D 903 (1958).
Children still have no right to be heard before the infliction of corporeal
punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-78 (1977), held that while
corporeal punishment in public schools implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interests, common law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process in view of
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Dixon arose when black students of the Alabama State College
were expelled without a hearing for engaging in civil rights demonstrations and protests. The students claimed they were arbitrarily
deprived of their right to public education without due process of
law, and the appellate court agreed. Due process required notice and
some opportunity to be heard before the students of a state institution
could be disciplined for misconduct. 43
The Supreme Court subsequently left no doubt as to the necessity
of procedural safeguards for a public school student facing suspension
or expulsion when it decided Goss v. Lopez." Reasoning that state
free public education and mandatory attendance laws created a legitimate claim of entitlement to secondary instruction, and hence a
protectable property interest under the fourteenth amendment, Justice
White for the majority believed the prerogative of educators to
maintain order in the schools, while broad, was not unlimited: "At
the very minimum . . . students facing suspension and the consequent
interference with a protected property interest must be given some
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. ' 45
In considering a suspension of ten days, the Court held that nine
students charged with various misdeeds within the Ohio public school
system, one of which was the destruction of property, 46 were at least
entitled to oral notice of the complaint against them and, if they
denied it, an explanation of the evidence and a chance to present their
respective stories. While the process due could immediately follow the
misconduct, the students could be removed prior to rudimentary
hearing only if they exhibited a continuing imminent danger to the
academic process. To prevent the diversion of educational resources,
the Court stopped short of affording the accused the full scale
protections of a criminal trial. It noted, however, that a longer
competing educational concerns. See generally Annotation, Administration of Corporeal Punishment in Public School System as Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under
Eighth Amendment, 25 A.L.R. FED. 431 (1975).
43. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
44. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). One Illinois commentator predicted the inevitable in
Nahmod, Illinois Public School Expulsions: The Impending Confrontation with Due
Process, 50 CHIC. BAR REc. 293, 298 (1969).
45. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (emphasis in original). While the
Court also recognized a liberty interest based upon the students' right to a good
reputation, its later holding in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) that reputation
was not liberty within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment casts serious doubt
on this earlier conclusion. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 730-31 n. 15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Goss, 419 U.S. at 570.
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4
suspension, or expulsion might require more formal procedures. 1
Courts in defining the parameters of procedural due process after
Dixon and Goss have uniformly asked what is fair and reasonable in

4
view of the educational concerns unique to the school setting. They
have recognized that school disciplinary proceedings must retain a
degree of flexibility if the informality of the educational experience is
to be preserved. 49 Consistent with Goss, courts generally agree that
0
the hearing may possess an aura not present in the courtroom. The
rules of evidence do not apply and thus, hearsay is admissible.'
Moreover, no right to cross-examine or confront witnesses usually
exists.12 Of course, the accused is guaranteed an impartial decisionmaker, but even a hearing officer's participation in a prosecutorial or
53
testimonial capacity does not create bias per se. Proof of actual bias

is required.14 Most cases also conclude that the student has no right
5 6
a list of witnesses5 7 or a summary
to a Miranda warning, 5 counsel

47. Id. at 581-83.
48. E.g., Long v. Thornton Township High School Dist., 82 F.R.D. 186, 191
(N.D. 11l.1979); Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 468 F. Supp. 54, 58
(E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1979); Hillman v. Elliot, 436 F.
Supp. 812, 815-16 (W.D. Va. 1977).
49. E.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986); Boster v.
Philpot, 645 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D. Kan. 1986).
50. E.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686; Brewer ex. rel Dreyfus v. Austin Indep.
School Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1985); Henson v. Honor Comm., 719 F.2d
69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983); Sykes v. Sweeney, 638 F. Supp. 274, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
51. E.g., Henson, 719 F.2d at 73; Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ. 492 F.2d
697, 701 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Nash v. Auburn Univ.,
621 F. Supp. 948, 956 (M.D. Ala. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 655 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Morale
v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1004 (D.N.H. 1976). See generally Annotation, Admis-

sibility of Hearsay Evidence in Student DisciplinaryProceedings, 30 A.L.R.4TH 935

(1984).
52. E.g., Nash, 812 F.2d at 664; Boykins, 492 F.2d at 701-02; Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972); Newsome v. Batavia Local School Dist.,
656 F. Supp. 147, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 920 (6th
Cir. 1988).
53. E.g., Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School Dist., 826 F.2d 526, 529
(7th Cir. 1987); Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 40203 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
54. E.g., Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988);
Lamb, 826 F.2d at 530; Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; Bignall v. North Idaho College,
538 F.2d 243, 247 (9th Cir. 1976); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d
1071, 1077 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973).
55. E.g., Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 631 n.l (7th Cir. 1972).
56. E.g., Henson v. Honor Comm., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983); Gabrilowitz
582 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1978); Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d
Newman,
v.
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of the testimony prior to hearing." The due process clause likewise
does not require an opportunity to appeal.5 9
As will be discussed, courts, absent a prejudicial procedural
defect, will almost always sustain a decision to suspend or expel an
unruly student if some evidence exists to support the school officials'
conclusion. 60 Even if the student admits guilt, however, due process
may still contemplate a hearing on the question of what discipline is
warranted for the misconduct. In Betts v. Board of Education of
Chicago,6' a high school sophomore confessed to sounding false fire
alarms, and was forced to transfer. Although acknowledging her
admission negated the need for any factual determination, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless established that where a penalty
"tantamount to expulsion" is involved, officials must give the pupil
an opportunity to present a mitigative argument. 62
Determining the "process due" in every instance is not a simple
task. The test of whether a student has received procedural due
process is one of "fundamental fairness in the light of the total
circumstances."63 The Supreme Court per Justice Brandeis established
long ago that "a hearing granted does not cease to be fair, merely
because rules of evidence and of procedure applicable in judicial
proceedings have not been strictly followed ... or because some
evidence has been improperly rejected or received."64 A transgression
of procedural due process occurs only where the defects in the hearing
result in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party. 65
763, 770 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). But cf. Sykes v. Sweeney,
638 F. Supp. 274, 278-79 & 278 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
57. E.g., Keough v. Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (5th
Cir. 1984); McClain v. Lafayette County Bd. of Educ., 673 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir.
1982); Linwood, 463 F.2d at 770; Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948, 954
(M.D. Ala. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987).
58. Keough, 748 F.2d at 1081-82; McClain, 673 F.2d at 110.
59. Brewer ex rel. Dreyfus v.Austin Indep. School Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263
(5th Cir. 1985); Nash, 621 F.Supp. at 957; Morale v.Grigel, 422 F.Supp. 988, 1004
(D.C.N.H.1976).
60. E.g., Smith v.Little Rock School Dist., 582 F.Supp. 159, 162 (E.D.Ark.
1984) ("if there isevidence to support the decision of a school board, itisimprovident
for the court to render a contrary judgment").
61. 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972).
62. Id. at 633. Accord Lamb v.Panhandle Community Unit School Dist., 826
F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1987); McClain v.LaFayette County Bd. of Educ., 673 F.2d
106, 110 (5th Cir. 1982).
63. Whitfield v.Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 894 (E.D.11.1970).
64. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923).
65. Id. Accord Keough v.Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1083 (5th
Cir. 1984); Sykes v.Sweeney, 638 F. Supp. at 274, 279 (E.D.Mo. 1986).
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Because the court must judge each case individually, the above
generalizations regarding the desire for certain procedures in a disciplinary hearing may not always apply. The severity of the proposed
66
sanction determines the validity of the process used. School boards
and administrators would be wise to provide the suspect prompt
written notice and ample time to prepare in every instance where
expulsion is a possibility. Although they have no power to subpoena
witnesses, officials should also allow free confrontation of those
willing to testify. Some courts have recognized that a student facing
expulsion should be allowed to confront those having knowledge of
the relevant facts. 67 Others have found a right of the accused to
counsel.

6

1

Goss v. Lopez teaches that the desire for certain procedures must
be balanced against the potential impediment to the educational
atmosphere: "To impose in each such case even truncated trial-type
procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many
places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in
educational effectiveness. "69 Unluckily for educators, the concept of
procedural due process simply does not lend itself to a fixed set of
rules applicable to all controversies.
B.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Like its procedural counterpart, due process' substantive com70
ponent is equated with fairness. Dixon anticipated the application
of this notion as well: "Turning then to the nature of the governmental
66. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 162
(2d Cir. 1971); Diggles v. Corsicana Indep. School Dist., 529 F. Supp. 169, 172
(N.D. Tex. 1981); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027,
1070-71 (1969).
67. Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 468 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D.
Ark. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1979); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp.
460, 469 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613,
623 (D.P.R. 1974). A few courts have also found in cases involving long-term
suspensions that the suspect should receive a list of witnesses and a summary of their
testimony prior to the hearing. See Keough, 748 F.2d at 1081.
68. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
69. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.
70. See generally Epley, Crime and Punishment: The Judicial Role in School
Discipline and Substantive Due Process, 19 EDUC. L. REP. 765 (1985); Rossow,
Administrative Discretion and Student Suspension: A Lion in Waiting, 13 J. L. &
EDUC. 417 (1984).
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power to expel the plaintiff, it must be conceded . . . that that power
is not unlimited and cannot be arbitrarily exercised. Admittedly, there
must be some reasonable and constitutional ground for expulsion or
the courts would have a duty to require reinstatement.'"' Whether
school officials' decision to suspend or expel a student will be considered arbitrary has come to depend principally upon two questions: 1)
Did the accused have adequate notice that the misconduct might
justify disciplinary sanctions? 2) Is the penalty so disproportionate to
the offense as to bear no rational relationship to a legitimate end?
1. Fair Warning
The rule that individuals must be given some warning of improper
behavior before they may be penalized for so acting is fundamental
to due process. 72 The reason is two-fold. First, a person of ordinary
intelligence must be able to understand what conduct is forbidden so
that he or she can freely decide whether to engage in certain activity."
Second, laws which provide indefinite standards may foster arbitrary
enforcement by public officials. 74 A statute or regulation which forbids
an act "in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." ' 75 Courts will declare penal
laws subject to many interpretations void for vagueness. 76 This precept
was the basis for a student's challenge to paragraph 10-22.6(a) of the
Illinois School Code-the provision empowering a school board "[tjo
expel pupils guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct. ' " 77
In Whitfield v. Simpson n7 a three-judge district court, convened
under the former 28 U.S.C. § 22817 9 to consider enjoining application
71. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
72. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
73. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
74. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
75. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925).
76. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 (1983); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d
827, 838 (1st Cir. 1985).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 10-22.6(a) (1987). See also id. at para. 1022.6(b) (empowering school board or its'designated official to suspend students guilty

of gross disobedience or misconduct). In accord with paragraph 10-22.6 is paragraph
34-19 of the School Code which allows the Chicago Board of Education to "expel,

suspend or otherwise discipline any pupil found guilty of gross disobedience, misconduct or other violation of the by-laws, rules and regulations." See infra notes 10917 and accompanying text.
78. 312 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Ill.
1970).
79. Repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1,90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
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of the statute, instead upheld a sixteen year old student's expulsion
for speaking improperly to teachers and leading song in school despite
80
the board's failure to pass any rule forbidding such activities. The
majority opinion reasoned that the language of the statute was clear
8
and definite of understanding, and therefore constitutional. 1 If legislation had to expressly enumerate the many situations which its
drafters might have had in mind when writing the bill, "it would nigh
be impossible to pass any intelligent law." 2 A common sense interpretation of the statute was left in the first instance to the authorities
charged with governing student conduct. Only if the law was unfairly
applied would the court intervene.
Relying on the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in Soglin v.
Kauffman, 3 Circuit Judge Cummings dissented, arguing paragraph
10-22.6(a) failed to supply the clear and narrow standards required
by due process.8 4 In Soglin, the court held that University of Wisconsin
officials' allegations of "misconduct" against students who openly
protested the on-campus presence of recruiters from Dow Chemical
could not pass constitutional muster. Because the university made no
reference to any preexisting rule which supplied a fair guide for the
accused, their actions could not serve as the basis for their expulsion.
The disciplinary standard of "misconduct," without more, fell for
vagueness. 5 Judge Cummings could not distinguish Soglin-something the majority had not attempted to do.
The Seventh Circuit subsequently adopted Judge Cummings' view6
and rejected Whitfield in Linwood v. Board of Education of Peoria1
when, in order to sustain the statute's validity, the court construed it
as a grant of power to school officials enabling them to formulate
specific standards of conduct. The board expelled Linwood after
finding him responsible for striking other students at school. The high
school's student code expressly defined physical assault as behavior
worthy of suspension or expulsion. The court held that paragraph 1022.6 was not void as a vague proscription of student activity but was
to be "implemented by appropriate rules adopted by the local school
80. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, paras. 10-20.5, 34-19 (1987) (granting school
boards power to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for government of student
conduct). See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
81. Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 897 (E.D. I11.1970).
82. Id. at 896.
83. 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
84. Whitfield, 312 F. Supp. at 897-98 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
85. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1969).
86. 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
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board to reasonably define and interdict the acts or omissions which
may be penalized by suspension or expulsion.""7 The decision declined, however, to grant unruly students free reign of schools without
written codes of conduct. A pupil committing an offense egregious
by any standard has no standing to claim a lack of fair warning."
In view of Linwood, school authorities are well advised to enact
a body of clear and specific guidelines to govern student behavior.
Given the authorities' need to impose sanctions for a wide range of
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, school
disciplinary rules certainly do not require the detail of criminal laws. 9
But a code of student conduct, complete with a list of possible
sanctions for its contravention, not only will prevent due process
contests on the basis of inadequate warning, but also will assist
functionaries in reaching a prompt decision on the merits of each
case.
As Linwood indicated, officials' hands are not tied for want of
a written rule if the offense violates accepted standards of behavior
and is truly gross. Courts do not wish to inhibit educators in facing
a problem of discipline simply because there is no preexisting rule on
the books. 9° A judge would be hard pressed to accept vandals'

assertions that they had insufficient notice of their crime's consequences. But school officials must remember to specifically inform
students when conduct arguably warranting disciplinary measures will
actually justify such penalties. 9'
2.

Rational Relationship

Once school officials have ensured a suspect fair warning and
appropriate procedures, the only viable constitutional issue remaining
involves the suitability of the chosen punishment. In that regard, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Wood v. Strickland" made
clear the point. Wood involved two high school students' challenge
to their expulsion for violating a regulation prohibiting the possession
of alcoholic beverages at school-sponsored activities. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
had been denied substantive due process, since the decision to expel
87. Linwood v. Board of Educ. of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
88. Id.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir. 1970).
HUDGINS & VACCA, supra note 20, at 299.
420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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them was based on insufficient evidence as well as an erroneous
reading of the rule. 93 The Supreme Court disagreed:
Given the fact that there was evidence supporting the
charge against respondents, the contrary judgment of the
Court of Appeals is improvident. It is not the role of federal
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which
the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.
Public high school students do have substantive and procedural
rights while at school. But § 1983 does not extend the right to
relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school
disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school
regulations. The system of public education that has evolved
in the Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members, and
§ 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court
corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which
do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional
guarantees .9
Assuming therefore that educators will not act arbitrarily and impose
95
punishment where literally no evidence exists to support guilt, or
interpret their rules in a way with which no reasonable person could
agree, 96 courts will strike down a sanction only if it is not rationally
related to the objective of providing an orderly and effective learning
atmosphere. 9
Perhaps the leading case finding no rational relationship between98
a student's offense and the selected punishment is Cook v. Edwards.
93. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
94. Wood, 420 U.S. at 326 (emphasis in original).
95. McDonald v. Board of Trustees, 375 F. Supp. 95, 102-04 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd,
503 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1974) ("some evidence" must support school's decision to
discipline student).
96. Board of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 970 (1982) (case may be
hypothesized where school board's interpretation of its rules is so extreme as to
violate due process).
97. Brewer ex rel. Dreyfus v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264
(5th Cir. 1985); Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1980);
Petrey v. Flaugher, 505 F. Supp. 1087, 1091-92 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
98. 341 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.H. 1972). See also Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1974) (sentence of permanent expulsion
from school remanded to board for determination of whether apparent disparity
between penalty and offense was justified).
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In Cook, District Judge Bownes, now sitting on the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, held that the indefinite expulsion of a fifteen year
old girl was unwarranted where she went to school intoxicated one
time because of difficulties with her parents, and created no disturbance. The decision found that to exclude a student from the classroom without evidence of any threat to school discipline was
fundamentally unfair. 99
Yet, lawsuits successfully advancing a lack of rational basis
argument are rare. Absent extenuating circumstances, courts permit
educational authorities to exercise wide discretion in passing judgment.' °0 One judge aptly stated: "For the Court to inject itself into
the manner in which school administrators wish to discipline school
children would constitute a significant intrusion by the Court into an
area of primary educational responsibility.'"0
Officials may even discipline a pupil for improper behavior
occurring off school premises if a sufficient nexus exists between the
misdeed and the pedagogical process.1 02 For instance, in Caldwell v.
Cannady'0 the district court sustained the expulsion of students for
possessing marijuana off school grounds and after school hours.
Although characterizing the scope of educators' authority to discipline
as a "troublesome issue," the court reasoned that because student
drug use might adversely affect the educational environment, a rule
which forbid such activity was a reasonable exercise of the school
board's discretion. 104
In determining whether authorities lawfully disciplined a student
for misconduct, courts place primary emphasis upon the punishment's
reasonableness in light of the general welfare and best interests of the
school. The /time and place of the occurrence are secondary considerations. Any misconduct which threatens the good order of the
school may ,subject a student to exclusion from the classroom. 05

99. Cook, 341 F. Supp. at 311.
100. Epley, supra note 70, at 772.
101. Rhodus v. Dumiller, 552 F. Supp. 425, 428 (M.D. La. 1982).
102. See generally Annotation, Right to Discipline Pupil for Conduct Away
From School Grounds or Not Immediately Connected With School Activities, 53
A.L.R.3D 1124 (1973).
103. 340 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
104. Id. at 838.
105. See, e.g., Krasnow v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 551 F.2d 591 (4th Cir.
1977) (ban on use and possession of drugs off campus upheld as basis of disciplinary
action); Pollnow v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 496
(2d Cir. 1985) (student's suspension for assaulting non-student off school premises
sustained).
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School officials have a duty to protect the system's pupils and property
10 6
from injury, and to see that public education is not jeopardized.
V.

ILLINOIS LAW

Under the state constitution, the General Assembly has plenary

authority, albeit implicit, to establish a system of student conduct in
Illinois. 10 7 The legislature, in turn, has deemed it appropriate to
delegate that prerogative to those presumably better able to determine
the specific needs of public education. The provisions of the Illinois
School Code'0 concerning discipline are broadly worded, granting
school boards the power to promulgate specific rules and regulations
for their districts. As a result, educators are necessarily given much
discretion in enacting reasonable guidelines by which to maintain
order in the schools.
The Code contains two provisions relating to the suspension and
expulsion of public school pupils. As previously discussed, paragraph
10-22.6 permits authorities to exclude students guilty of "gross disobedience or misconduct."'°9 While only the board can expel an unruly

106. At this point, it is proper to note that school officials sued individually for
damages due to a student's purported constitutional deprivation may assert the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity. This shield, designed to provide public
officers freedom to perform their duties without the fear of harassing litigation and
monetary liability, applies if the functionaries in disciplining a student did not violate
"clearly established" constitutional rights:
[Wlhether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful action generally turns on the
"objective legal reasonableness" of the action, assessed in light of the legal
rules that were "clearly established" at the time it was taken....
The contours of the [pupil's] right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.
Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-39 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982)). The school board, as an entity charged in its official
capacity, is not entitled to raise the defense of immunity. See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
Notwithstanding the (in)applicability of the immunity defense, the Illinois legislature has directed that school boards indemnify individual members and employees
for legal damages arising from performance of their duties. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
paras. 10-20.20, 34-18.1 (1987).
107. See ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("[s]tate shall provide for an efficient system
of high quality public educational institutions").
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, paras. 1-1 to 36-1 (1987).
109. Id. at para. 10-22.6.
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student,"10 it may authorize the superintendent or principal by regulation to suspend a pupil for not more than ten days."' Similarly,
paragraph 34-19, which applies solely to school districts in excess of
500,000 residents," 2 directs the Chicago Board of Education to establish rules providing for a "uniform system of discipline" and empowers it to expel or suspend a student for misdoings.1 3 Of course, the
Seventh Circuit's decisions in Linwood"4 and Soglin"5 teach that all
districts must publish written rules to govern student behavior if they
wish to minimize the possibility of constitutional challenges to their
disciplinary actions. Thus, the counterpart to paragraph 34-19's behest
for express regulations applicable to downstate school districts is
paragraph 10-20.5.116 It allows school boards "[tlo adopt and enforce
all necessary rules for the management and government of the public
schools."" 7
Any complete canon of student conduct must contain procedural
as well as substantive precepts. Once authorities suspect that a student
has engaged in "misconduct" as they have defined the term, the
procedures employed to determine culpability become all too impor110. Id. at para. 10-22.6(a). Subsection (a) grants the school board the power
"[tjo expel pupils guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct, and no action shall lie

against them for such expulsion ......

111. Id. at para. 10-22.6(b). Subsection (b) grants the school board the power
"[t]o suspend or by regulation to authorize the superintendent of the district or the
principal, assistant principal, or dean of students of any school to suspend pupils
guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct . . . and no action shall lie against them
for such suspension ......
112. Id. at para. 34-1 (Article 34 applies only to cities having a population
exceeding 500,000).
In legislating Article 34, the General Assembly recognized the problems inherent
in the supervision of an educational system composed of over 590 public schools.
Because the complexities of the Chicago school district demanded a highly competent
and independent board, the legislature concluded that its members should be governed
by a separate set of laws. See Latham v. Bd. of Educ., 31 Ill. 2d 178, 184, 201
N.E.2d 111, 115 (1964) (upholding constitutionality of Chicago Board of Education).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 34-19 (1987):
The board shall ... establish by-laws, rules and regulations, which shall
have the force of ordinances, for the proper maintenance of a uniform
system of discipline for both employees and pupils, and for the entire
management of the schools ....

It may expel, suspend or otherwise disci-

pline any pupil found guilty of gross disobedience, misconduct or other
violation of the by-laws, rules and regulations ....
114. Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d at 763.
115. Soglin v. Kaufmann, 418 F.2d at 163.

116. ILL. REV.
117. Id.

STAT.

ch. 122, para. 10-20.5 (1987).
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tant. Article 34 of the School Code' 8 leaves the chosen procedures
entirely to the Chicago board's judgment. Under paragraph 10-22.6,
however, a school board may expel a pupil "only after the parents
have been requested to appear at a meeting of the board, or with a
19
hearing officer appointed by it, to discuss their child's behavior.""
If a hearing officer is appointed, he or she is required to file a written
summary with the board, which will then take the action it finds
appropriate. 2 0 The board must likewise promptly notify the parents
of their child's suspension.' 2 1 Upon request, the board or its authorized
22
agent will then review the sanction in the presence of the parents.
Noticeably absent from paragraph 10-22.6 is the requirement,
enunciated in Goss,21 that prior to suspension a student is at least
entitled to notice of the charges and some chance to respond. The
statute also fails to ensure the individual threatened with expulsion
any real opportunity to be heard. It does not demand that the accused
be permitted to speak or refute the evidence. Because of these
shortcomings, the law is subject to attack. 124 Although no court has
118. Id. at para. 34-1 to 34-128.
119. Id. at para. 10-22.6(a).
120. Id. Subsection (a) reads in relevant part:
Expulsion shall take place only after the parents have been requested
to appear at a meeting of the board, or with a hearing officer appointed by
it, to discuss their child's behavior. Such request shall be made by registered
or certified mail and shall state the time, place and purpose of the meeting.
The board, or a hearing officer appointed by it, at such meeting shall state
the reasons for dismissal and the date on which the expulsion is to become
effective. If a hearing officer is appointed by the board he shall report to
the board a written summary of the evidence heard at the meeting and the
board may take such action thereon as it finds appropriate.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 10-22.6(b) (1987).
122. Id. Subsection (b) reads in relevant part:
Any suspension shall be reported immediately to the parents or guardian
of such pupil along with a full statement of the reasons for such suspension
and a notice of their right to a review, a copy of which shall be given to
the school board. Upon request of the parents or guardian the school board
or a hearing officer appointed by it shall review such action of the superintendent or principal, assistant principal, or dean of students. At such
review the parents or guardian of the pupil may appear and discuss the
suspension with the board or its hearing officer. If a hearing officer is
appointed by the board he shall report to the board a written summary of
the evidence heard at the meeting. After its hearing or upon receipt of the
written report of its hearing officer, the board may take such action as it
finds appropriate.
123. 419 U.S. at 565.
124. See supra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
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addressed its constitutionality, 2 ' educators who afford students accused of wrongdoing only those measures set forth in paragraph 1022.6 may find themselves involved in a lawsuit.
With the advent of the § 1983 civil rights action, state court suits
challenging a public school suspension or expulsion as violative of the
Illinois School Code are relatively uncommon. Rather, students today
prefer to characterize their grievances in constitutional terms. Illinois
is not precluded from affording students greater due process protections than required by the Federal Constitution, 126 but it has yet to
do so. 127 And until it does, federal courts within the State will most
likely continue to entertain the majority of lawsuits questioning school

authority. Since Goss, Illinois forums have reported no cases discussing the procedural aspect of a pupil's constitutional guarantees. In
the zone of substantive rights, however, the applicable law is settled.

Regardless of whether a plaintiff expressly rests his objection

upon the substantive assurances of due process, contemporary Illinois
courts have uniformly held that school authorities' determinations to
exclude a disruptive student shall be disturbed only if "arbitrary,
unreasonable, capricious or oppressive."'' 2 That no public official's

125. In Davis v. Thompson, 79 Ill.
App. 3d 613, 399 N.E.2d 195 (5th Dist.
1979), plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of paragraph 10-22.6, but the court
declined to reach the issue. Because the complaint failed to allege the facts which
precipitated the punishment, it failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 616, 399
N.E.2d at 197-98.
126. E.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); People v. Tisler, 103 Il. 2d 226,
254, 469 N.E.2d 147, 161 (1984) (Ward, J., concurring); Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
127. E.g., Knight v. Board of Educ., 38 Ill. App. 3d 603, 606, 348 N.E.2d 299,
301 (4th Dist. 1976) (Illinois constitution's due process clause guarantees same rights
as due process clause of fourteenth amendment); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 Commentary
at 109-110 (Smith-Hurd 1971) (Illinois courts have interpreted article I's due process
clause as protecting same guarantees as due process clause of Federal Constitution).
See generally McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent Legal
Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1 (1987).
128. Wilson v. Collinsville Community Unit School Dist., 116 Ill.
App. 3d 557,
562, 451 N.E.2d 939, 942 (5th Dist. 1983). Accord Clements v. Board of Educ., 133
Ill. App. 3d 531, 533, 478 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (4th Dist. 1985) (where student
contended public school officials subjected her to improper treatment, but no
deprivation of constitutional rights was alleged, standard to determine propriety of
punishment was whether it was arbitrary or capricious); Myre v. Board of Educ.,
108 Ill.
App. 3d 440, 452, 439 N.E.2d 74, 82 (3d Dist. 1982) (Alloy, J., dissenting)
(test for reviewing alleged substantive due process violation resulting from in-school
suspension is whether action of the board is arbitrary and capricious in that a rational
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decision has been overturned in Illinois on that account is not surprising given the law's history of deferring to educators' sound
judgment. The court reiterated the view of American jurisprudence
in Donaldson v. Danville Board of Education, 29 a decision upholding
plaintiff's three-day suspension for fighting in school:
School discipline is an area which courts enter with great
hesitation and reluctance-and rightly so. School officials are
trained and paid to determine what form of punishment best
addresses a particular student's transgression. They are in a
far better position than is a black-robed judge to decide what
Because of their
to do with a disobedient child at school ....
expertise and their closeness to the situation-and because we
do not want them to fear court challenges to their every actschool officials are given wide discretion in their disciplinary
actions.

130

VI.

STUDENT VANDALS

Considering courts' unwillingness to place their judgment ahead
of educators who are privy to the situation, the most disturbing aspect
of disciplining student vandals appears to be catching them. Because
3
most acts of vandalism occur after school or on the weekends, ' few
reported cases address the problem. Those decisions discussing the
offense, however, leave no doubt that excluding the culprits from the
classroom promotes the school district's legitimate interest in preserving the system.

3

2

An example is the Mississippi Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Clinton Municipal Separate School District v. Byrd.'33 In that case,
two students caught painting on a high school wall were suspended
for a semester pursuant to a written policy of the board. Plaintiffs
thereafter instituted a suit challenging the propriety of the chosen
punishment. Reasoning that the power to determine the matter had
relationship between punishment and- disciplinary objectives is lacking). Compare
Knight, 38 111. App. 3d at 608, 348 N.E.2d at 303 (test to determine whether sanction
requiring grade reduction for unexcused absence deprived pupil of substantive due

process was to weigh severity of punitive effect against severity of misconduct).
129. 98 Ill. App. 3d 438, 424 N.E.2d 737 (4th Dist. 1981).
130. Donaldson v. Danville Board of Education, 98 Ill. App. 3d 438, 439, 424
N.E.2d 737, 738-39 (4th Dist. 1981).
131. Final Report, supra note 4, at 35.

132. See, e.g., Boster v. Philpot, 645 F. Supp. 798, 808 (D. Kan. 1986).

133. 477 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1985).
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been committed by law to the school authorities, the court upheld the
sanction despite disagreeing with what it perceived as a harsh decision:' 3 4 "The rule at issue here and the punishment . . . fairly viewed
further substantial legitimate interests of the school district. . . .What
the board has done . . . violates no rule of law which has been called
to our attention, nor any right secured to these girls by any such
rule." ' 5
Some state legislatures have recognized the adverse consequences
of vandalism on public education and have enacted laws specifically
permitting the suspension or expulsion of pupils responsible for
destroying school property regardless of when the misconduct occurs. 3 6 In New Jersey, for example, statutory law dictates that "[a]ny
pupil . . . who shall cut, deface or otherwise injure any school
property, shall be liable to punishment and to suspension or expulsion
from school."' 3 7 Interpreting a similar version of the statute,' the
New Jersey Superior Court in Board of Education v. Hansen stated
that "[t]he Legislature has authority to impose restrictions on those
seeking to attend public schools and can suspend or expel for events
happening outside of school hours.", 3 9
The New Jersey legislature has acknowledged that damage to
school property caused by the wilful misdeeds of students substantially
interferes with the general welfare and best interests of the school and
its operation. While the Illinois General Assembly has placed much
more discretion with educational authorities regarding student discipline for destructive acts, no meaningful distinction can be drawn
between a legislature promulgating specific rules and a legislature
giving the school board the power to do so.
Assuming some evidence was present in addition to their exclusion
from the field trip to implicate the students portrayed in the opening
paragraphs, school officials could have properly suspended them for
a short period after a hearing consistent with Goss and its progeny.
Although only four days remained before the close of the term, and
the suspects might have missed final exams, the Seventh Circuit in
134. Clinton Mun. Separate School Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 242 (Miss.
1985).
135. Id. at 241-42.
136. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5-4(b)(1)(C), (c) (Bums Supp. 1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150(1)(a), (b) (Baldwin 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-19
(1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-201(2) (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13-325 (1982).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 37-2 (West Supp. 1987).
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 37-2 (West 1968) (amended 1969, 1979, 1981).
139. 56 N.J. Super. 567, 571, 153 A.2d 393, 395 (1959).
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140
Lamb v. PanhandleCommunity Unit School District recently ruled
that such a sanction, while lacking compassion, does not alone raise
problems of constitutional proportions.
In Lamb, the principal suspended the plaintiff, a senior in high
school, for the final three days of the school year after the student
admitted drinking whiskey on a class outing. Consequently, Lamb
missed final exams and was unable to graduate due to failing grades.
Affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court of appeals agreed
with the district court that "a different disposition . . . might have
been worked out because of the timing. ' ' 14' Nonetheless, the court
realized the question was not whether it agreed with the principal's
decision, but only whether he had abused his discretion in so acting.
The court felt he had not.
A more difficult question concerns the legality of a suspension
or expulsion to begin at the onset of the fall semester. The Office of
the Illinois Attorney General believes a school board may not expel a
1 42
student for more than the remaining academic year. Its position,
however, relies solely on dicta from an 1889 decision of the Illinois
43
Appellate Court. In Board of Education v. Helston,' a fourteen year
old boy was indefinitely suspended from school in November for
refusing to give authorities the name of another pupil who apparently
wrote obscenities on the schoolhouse. The trial judge ordered the
child reinstated and adjudged costs against the board. On appeal, the
Third District reversed only the award of costs. Because the school
year in which the plaintiff was suspended had ended, the court
1
presumed he was no longer "debarred of school privileges." " Therefore, the question of his reinstatement was moot.
Perhaps where a student has already served a lengthy expulsion,
as did Helston, extending the punishment into the fall term would be
deemed arbitrary. The severity of the sanction must be commensurate

140. 826 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1987).
141. Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School Dist., 826 F.2d 526, 530 (7th
Cir. 1987).
142. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. 97.
143. 32 Ill. App. 300 (3d Dist. 1889).
144. Board of Educ. v. Helston, 32 Ill. App. 300, 304 (3d Dist. 1889). The court
reasoned:
It appears from the record that the relator was suspended from the school
November 9, 1888, until he would comply with the requirements of the
board. This suspension would not be construed to continue beyond the
school year then current, and as that year has now expired the relator
presumably is not now debarred of school privileges. The only point having
legal significance remaining in the record is as to the costs in the court
below which were adjudged against the board.
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with the extent of the damage. But the Attorney General's opinion
does not account for the situation where the misconduct occurs
immediately prior to or during summer vacation. No court has decided
the due process ramifications of that issue, and the few commentators
who have mentioned the problem disagree. 145
Vandalism threatens to impede the educational process at all
times. School authorities have a responsibility not only to deter
potential offenders, but also to preserve the facilities which are so
germane to a quality education. 146 While courts must ensure that
officials afford student vandals procedural and substantive guarantees,
they cannot reasonably force educators to withhold punishment until
the school is destroyed. Must authorities wait until vandals burn down
the schoolhouse during summer vacation to safely conclude that the
educational process has been disrupted and that the perpetrators may
be excluded from the classroom? Surely not.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The education of our nation's youth is not the responsibility of
judges, but of parents, teachers and school officials. When properly
informed of student's rights, Illinois educators may fulfill their duty
to maintain good order in the schools confident that their actions
comply with the Constitution and will not be disturbed by the courts.
The prompt correction of student vandals is necessary to discourage
further misrule. There is no place for hesitancy in confronting a
problem which costs taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars each
year. The words of a nineteenth century Illinois Appellate Court ring
true today: "It need not be argued that the defacement of a public
school building . . . is an intolerable offense and that the most radical
measures should be resorted to, if necessary, to prevent a repetition
147

of it."'

145. Compare VOORHESS, supra note 25, at 200 (authorities have no jurisdiction
to expel pupils after the school year's end) with W. GAUERKE, WHAT EDUCATORS
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SCHOOL LAW 51 (1968) (authorities may govern student conduct
during summer vacation).
146. See Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill.
567, 571 (1875) (twin aims of suspension and
expulsion are punishment of the child and preservation of order).
147. Board of Educ. v. Helston, 32 111. App. 300, 305 (3d Dist. 1889).
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APPENDIX
The proposed regulation attempts to incorporate the constitutional and statutory principles of which Illinois educators should be
aware prior to disciplining student vandals.
PROPOSAL
Whereas students' intentional destruction and theft of school
property jeopardize the academic process, the board of education,
vested with the duty to preserve the facilities and good order necessary
to achieve educational objectives, hereby promulgates the following
guidelines, consistent with pupils' constitutional and statutory rights,
to assist in confronting student vandalism:
Any student who wilfully defaces, destroys, or steals school
property, or assists another in so doing, regardless of the timing of
the offense, is subject to suspension and/or expulsion from school.
The board of education, superintendent, principal, or assistant principal may suspend a student found guilty of such offense for a period
not to exceed ten (10) days, consistent with the procedures outlined
in part (A) below. Only the board of education may expel a student
found guilty of such offense, consistent with the procedures outlined
in part (B) below. No expulsion shall extend beyond the remainder of
the academic year; provided that, if the offense occurs during summer
break, the expulsion may extend through the next academic year.
(A) Prior to suspending a student for a violation of this rule, the
appropriate authority, enumerated above, must orally notify the
accused of the charges against him/her, and explain the evidence in
support thereof. The student, at that time, must be afforded an
opportunity to deny the charges, proffer his/her version of the facts,
and discuss the penalty warranted for the offense. Consistent with
the evidence, the authority must then absolve or suspend the student.
The length (not to exceed ten days) and nature (in- or out-of-school)
of any suspension is within the sound discretion of the suspending
officer.
Any suspension must be reported immediately to the parents or
guardian of the student, along with a statement of the basis for the
discipline and a notice of a right to review. Upon prompt request of
the parents or guardian, the school board will meet to review and
consider the action of the suspending officer. At that time, the parents.
or guardian may appear before and discuss the suspension with the
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board of education, which shall then take the action it deems appropriate. *
This right of review shall not stay the decision of the suspending
officer.
(B) Prior to expelling a student for a violation of this rule, the
board of education must notify the accused, and his/her parents or
guardian, by certified mail of the charges, and briefly describe the
evidence in. support thereof. Such notice must inform the student,
and his/her parents or guardian, of the right to appear at a meeting
of the board, set for a date not less than six (6) days after mailing,
to contest the charges, proffer the student's version of the facts, and
discuss the penalty warranted for the offense. At the meeting, the
student shall have the right to be accompanied by retained counsel,
to present witnesses in his/her favor, and to confront those having
knowledge of the relevant facts. Consistent with the evidence, the
board of education must then absolve or expel the student. The length
(not to exceed the remainder of the academic year) of any expulsion
is within the sound discretion of the board.
Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the board of education from
affording students greater substantive and procedural protections than
provided herein.

As noted in the text, due process does not require that a student be provided
an opportunity to appeal a suspension. See supra text accompanying note 59. A
student does have a right, however, to appeal a suspension under Illinois law. See
supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
*

